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SUPREME COURT REFORM:
DESIRABLE-AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
DAVID ORENTLICHER

As decisions by-and appointments to-the Supreme Court have
become increasingly divisive, 1 many observers have renewed calls for
reform. 2 For example, we could replace lifetime tenure with non-renewable
terms of eighteen years, such that one term ends every two years. 3 That way,
less would be at stake with each nomination, Justices could not time their
retirements for partisan reasons, and appointments would be divided more
evenly between Democratic and Republican presidents. Or we could
establish a non-partisan, judicial nominating commission.4
Concerns about the Supreme Court are not new, but increasing political
polarization and partisan maneuvering over the two most recent Court
appointments have accentuated tensions. With the legitimacy of the Court at
*.
Cobeaga Law Firm Professor of Law, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law; M.D., Harvard
Medical School; J.D., Harvard Law School. This essay draws on my earlier discussions of ideological
bias, infra note 2, and makes the novel argument that ideological balance is constitutionally required. I
am grateful for the comments of Judy Failer and Ruben Garcia, the research assistance of Lena Rieke,
and the editorial assistance of Daniel Brovman and other Southern California Law Review editors.
1. While the U.S. Senate approved the appointment of Justice Anthony Kennedy by a 97-0 vote,
his successor, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, squeaked by on a vote of 50-48. Similarly, the Senate approved
Justice Antonin Scalia by a vote of 98-0, while the vote on his successor, Justice Neil Gorsuch, was 5445. Supreme Court Nominations. present-1789, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout

/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
2. I have previously discussed the desirability of ideological balance on the Supreme Court in
David Orentlicher, Politics and the Supreme Court. The Need for Ideological Balance, 79 U. PITT. L.
REV. 411 (2018), and DAVID ORENTLICHER, Two PRESIDENTS ARE BETTER THAN ONE: THE CASE FOR
A BIPARTISAN EXECUTIVE 27-31 (2013).
3.
See generally ROGER C. CRAMTON & PAUL D. CARRINGTON, REFORMING THE COURT: TERM
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2006).

4. Many states have judicial nominating commissions, though they tend to be partisan since the
governor appoints many of the commission members. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. VII, § 9; KAN. CONST.
art. III, § 5(e).
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stake, reform to depoliticize the Court seems essential. And whichever
reform is promoted, it is generally assumed that implementation would
require a constitutional amendment, legislation, or a change in Senate rules.
But the conventional wisdom is wrong. There is a sound argument to
be made that Supreme Court reform is constitutionally required.
DUE PROCESS AND IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE
With Justice Brett Kavanaugh's appointment to the Supreme Court, it
seems pretty clear that President Donald Trump and Senate Republicans
have been able to solidify a staunchly conservative majority on the Court. In
all likelihood, this new majority will stake out firmly conservative positions
on a range of critical issues, including voting rights, reproductive rights, and
corporate rights. With a second Trump nominee on the bench, the Supreme
Court will bring a strong ideological bias to its decision making. While that
is highly controversial, it is one of the features of our judicial appointment
process. As is often said, elections have consequences.
Or should they when it comes to the judicial branch? We ought to
consider the constitutional implications of ideological bias on the Supreme
Court. In particular, principles of due process and the framers' original intent
provide good reason to think that neither a conservative nor liberal Court
majority should be able to impose its views on the country.

A. IDEOLOGICAL BIAS AND DuE PROCESS
The Due Process Clause promises litigants that they will receive
an impartial hearing before a neutral court.6 And a neutral court decides
cases without any personal, political, or other bias.7 With a fifth strongly
conservative Justice on the Supreme Court, it is not a neutral court. Any party
promoting a liberal viewpoint before the Justices will not be able to count on
a fair shot at prevailing. 8
To be sure, if Justices merely acted like umpires, doing something akin

&

5.
The logic of my argument also would apply to the circuit courts of appeal, as well as state
appellate courts.
6.
Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State Judicial
Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism, 56 WM.

MARY L. REV. 1, 34, 36-37 (2014).
7.

Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 499-

509 (2013).
8.
Likewise, if a fifth liberal Justice had joined the Court, parties promoting a conservative
viewpoint would not be able to count on a fair shot at prevailing.
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to the calling of balls and strikes, as suggested by Chief Justice John Roberts
in his confirmation hearings, 9 a Justice's political philosophy would not
matter. But of course, a Justice's political philosophy does matter. 10
Otherwise, Republican Senators would have considered Judge Merrick
Garland's nomination to the Supreme Court in 2016, and other nominations
also would not fail because of partisan opposition. Some Justices take more
conservative positions, while others take more liberal positions." A
conservative majority will render different decisions on environmental
regulation, consumer protection, or voting rights than will a liberal majority.
When Court decisions reflect the philosophical leanings of the Justices, and
decisions can be determined by one side of the ideological spectrum, our
system denies an impartial hearing to parties on the other side of the
ideological spectrum. And that is fundamentally unfair in a constitutional
system that promises litigants due process in court.
Because it is unfair for litigants to have their cases decided by an
ideologically-biased court, other countries have designed their highest courts
so decisions do not reflect only one side of the philosophical spectrum.
Arguably, due process requires something similar for the Supreme Court.
A strong view of due process would demand ideological moderation for
each Justice, an approach taken in some European countries. In Germany,
for example, nominees to the Constitutional Court must receive a two-thirds
vote of approval and therefore must appeal to legislators on both sides of the
partisan aisle. 12 Instead of getting judges who are either strongly
conservative or liberal, German litigants get judges who are moderate. Like
Germany, Portugal and Spain require supermajority votes for appointments
to their constitutional courts. 13 So we might say that due process requires
restoration of a strong filibuster rule in the Senate or a strong supermajority
on final voting for judicial nominations. That would force presidents to
nominate Justices acceptable to both conservatives and liberals. 14
9.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005).
10.

LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL

STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 103 (2013).
11.
Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How
Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483, 1491 (2007).
12.

GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 83 (2005); Bruce

Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 669 (2000).
13.
John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication. Lessons from Europe, 82

TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1682 (2004).
14. This approach would be especially valuable at the district court level, where there is a single
judge deciding cases.
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A less demanding view of due process would focus on overall balance
on the Court rather than on the ideologies of individual Justices. While there
are different ways to achieve overall balance,15 the simplest path for the
Supreme Court would be to follow the example of a number of countries. In
many European nations, high court decisions are made by consensus, or at
least a supermajority vote, so Justices on both sides of the ideological
spectrum have to support the courts' opinions. 16 The U.S. Supreme Court
itself observed a norm of consensual decision-making for most of its history.
Until 1941, the Justices typically spoke unanimously.17 Only about 8% of
cases included a dissenting opinion. Now, one or more Justices dissent in
about 60% of rulings.18 Chief Justice John Roberts has pushed for greater
consensus on the Court, 19 saying that the court functions best "when it can
deliver one clear and focused opinion."20
An advantage of this path to ideological balance is that it allows for a
greater range of perspectives among the different Justices. Instead of nine
relatively moderate Justices, we would get a mix of conservative and liberal
Justices. And that would make for a stronger decision making process.
Studies on group decision making demonstrate that better outcomes result
when the decision makers bring a range of viewpoints to the table. 21
Accordingly, I discuss this path to ideological balance in the remainder of
this essay.
How large should a supermajority be? Since there may be times when
six Justices are either conservative or liberal, it probably would be necessary
to require more than a two-thirds supermajority to ensure that decisions
always reflect the perspectives of both sides of the philosophical divide. We
could require at least a 7-2 vote or even decision-making by consensus of the
15.

Orentlicher, supra note 2, at 417-23.

16.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DISSENTING OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE MEMBER

STATES (2012),

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201304/20130423ATT64963

/20130423ATT64963EN.pdf
17.

Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV.

769, 771 (2015).
18. Id. at 776-77.
19.
Hope Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, WASH. POST (May 21, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100678.html.
20.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Chief Justice Roberts and the Role of the Supreme Court, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/chief-justice-roberts-and b

40277.html.
21.

ALAN BLINDER, THE QUIET REVOLUTION: CENTRAL BANKING GOES MODERN 43 (2004);

SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS,

SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 2-3 (2007); Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers

Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16385 (2004).
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entire Court.
B. IDEOLOGICAL BIAS AND ORIGINAL INTENT

What would the framers think about this? On one hand, they did not
include in Article III of the Constitution a requirement for ideological
balance on the Supreme Court. On the other hand, they did not reject
ideological balance. Moreover, they recognized the need to amend the
Constitution with a Bill of Rights that includes the Due Process Clause's
guarantee of impartial courts.
The framers' intent is consistent with this essay's due process analysis.
With ideological balance, the Supreme Court would be more faithful to the
framers' design for our constitutional system. The Founding Fathers worried
greatly about "factions" pursuing their self-interest to the detriment of the
overall public good. Accordingly, the constitutional drafters devised a
system that they thought would block factional control of the national
government. 22 But the framers did not anticipate the extent to which political
parties would form dominant factions that could gain command of
government power. For example, the framers did not anticipate how partisan
ties between presidents and members of Congress would limit the legislative
branch's checking and balancing of the executive branch. 23 Similarly, the
framers did not expect-nor did they want-a Supreme Court that would
reflect the views of only one side of the ideological spectrum. Indeed, when
Alexander Hamilton explained the Constitution's appointment provisions
in The Federalist Papers, he emphasized the need to avoid nominations that
reflect partiality instead of the overall public interest. 24
The Due Process Clause and original intent both support ideological
balance on the Supreme Court. As discussed in the next section, Supreme
Court precedent is consistent with such a requirement.
C.

IDEOLOGICAL BIAS AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

In previous cases, the Supreme Court has observed that constitutional
concerns are not raised when a judge favors one or another ideological
view. 25 Anyone with the appropriate training and experience for the judiciary
will have opinions on important legal issues. According to the Court, due
22.
23.

GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-21 (7th ed. 2013).
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.

2311, 2313, 2323-24 (2006).
24.
THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
25. The Court's opinion in Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), provides
a nice summary of the Court's discussions of the topic.
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process prohibits judicial bias against a party to a proceeding, not bias
against a legal view that the party might advocate.2 6
But there are important reasons to distinguish Court discussions of the
issue. First, these discussions were dicta. The question whether it is
impermissible for an appellate court to have an overall ideological bias has
not been decided by the Court. Rather, it has come up in cases addressing
other issues of judicial neutrality. In RepublicanParty ofMinnesota v. White,
for example, the issue before the Court was whether a state could prohibit
judicial candidates from announcing their positions on issues that might
come before them if elected.27 In another case, Tumey v. Ohio, the issue
before the Court was whether judges could have a financial stake in the
outcome of their decisions. 2 8
Second, the Court's reasoning is consistent with a due process argument
against a Court that has an overall ideological bias. In Republican Party of
Minnesota, the Justices discussed the kinds of personal biases that should
disqualify a judge, and the Court wrote that a judge's ideological bias is not
disqualifying in the way that a personal financial bias is disqualifying. It took
that view in Republican PartyofMinnesota and earlier cases because anyone
who has the experience and training that would be desirable in a judge will
inevitably develop an ideological bias. 29 But the fact that we must accept
individual judges with ideological leanings does not prevent us from
ensuring an overall ideological balance on the Court. Under a fair reading of
the Constitution, litigants ought to be able to ensure that their cases are
decided in an ideologically-balanced way.
In addition, it is difficult to identify a good reason for permitting the
Court to function with a majority on one side or the other of the ideological
spectrum. While we can point to the principle of majority rule to justify
partisan control in the executive or legislative branches, popular majorities
do not deserve special recognition in a judicial branch that should be guided
by legal principle rather than prevailing sentiment.
26.

Id. at 777-78.

27.

Id. at 768. The Court held that the prohibition violated the First Amendment. Id. at 788.

28.

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514-15 (1927). The Court held that the judges' financial

interests violated due process. Id at 534.
29.
Republican Party ofMinnesota, 536 U.S. at 777-78.
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D. POTENTIAL CONCERNS WITH A REQUIREMENT OF IDEOLOGICAL
BALANCE

In general, concerns about cost, efficiency, and fairness have limited
policies to address judicial bias. 30 For example, one solution to judicial bias
is recusal of the biased judge. But if reasons for recusal are not strictly
limited, litigants might clog the courts with baseless recusal motions, 31 and
lawyers might exploit the rules to game the system in favor of their clients. 32
Supreme Court Justices also have resisted strict recusal rules on the ground
that there is no one who can step in for the disqualified Justice. 33 A
supermajority requirement avoids the problems raised by judicial
disqualification. It addresses bias not by removing partial Justices, but by
counterbalancing their partialities.
Still, one might worry that a supermajority requirement would lead the
Court to deadlock with some frequency and leave too many issues to be
decided by the lower courts. However, a few considerations indicate that it
is unlikely to do so. First, the Justices would have a strong incentive to find
common ground. Supreme Court Justices want to leave their imprint on the
law-after spending years, if not decades, maneuvering for a Court
appointment and having reached the pinnacle of the judiciary, they would be
driven by their desire to leave an important judicial legacy. If the Justices
spent their years on the Court bogged down in gridlock, they would not be
able to issue key decisions that would allow them to make a difference in
resolving critical legal questions. Accordingly, they would come to
accommodations that would allow them to issue important decisions.
Empirical evidence supports this prediction. High courts operate
successfully under a supermajority requirement in other countries. In
addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively operated under a
supermajority requirement from time to time. On a number of occasions, the
Court has heard cases with only eight members and therefore has needed a
62.5% supermajority (5/8) to reach a decision. Sometimes this happens when
a seat is temporarily unfilled; other times when Justices take ill or have to
recuse themselves. 34 In a study of the 1,319 cases in which a tie could have
30. Geyh, supra note 7, at 514-15.
31. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 890-91, 899-900 (2009) (Roberts C.J.,
dissenting).
32. Id. at 903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33.

Gabriel Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38 PEPP.

L. REv. 1109, 1136-38 (2011).
34. There also have been periods when the Court had an even number of Justices. For most of the
period between 1789 and 1807, the Court had six members. Why Does the Supreme Court Have Nine
Justices?, CONST. DAILY (July 6, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/why-does-the-supreme-court
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occurred between the 1946 and 2003 terms of the Court, researchers found
that a tie vote occurred less than 6% of the time. 35 And, of course, a number
of landmark decisions have been decided by a supermajority vote. A 9-0
Court issued its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,36 a 7-2 Court issued
its opinion in Roe v. Wade, 37 and a 4-0 Court issued its opinion in Marbury
v. Madison.38
The experience with juries also suggests that supermajority courts
would reach decisions regularly. Criminal court juries typically have twelve
members, and they usually have to reach unanimous decisions. Hung juries
occur, but not very often. 39 Moreover, juries reach their unanimous decisions
in a setting that allows for less compromise than does a decision by the
Supreme Court. A criminal jury must acquit or convict. 40 The example of
juries is important for a second reason. I have argued that to be impartial, the
Court should issue decisions that reflect the views of Justices from both sides
of the ideological spectrum. 4 1 Similarly, in defining the meaning of an
impartial jury, the Supreme Court has required that jurors be drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community. 42
Game theory provides further reason to believe that the Court would
find middle ground regularly under a supermajority requirement. Game
theory can identify the kinds of relationships that are likely to encourage
cooperative rather than oppositional strategies. 43 The Supreme Court
includes important elements of cooperative relationships. For example, when
individuals have an ongoing relationship with frequent and repeated
interactions, as with members of the Court, they are much more likely to
-have-nine-justices.
35.
Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the "Problem" of an Equally Divided Supreme

Court, 7 J. APP. PRACT. & PROC. 75, 85-86 (2005).
36. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). The Marbury Court had six Justices, but two did not
take part because of illness.
39.
Studies suggest an average hung jury rate of around 6% nationwide. PAULA L. HANNAFORDAGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM?: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov

/pdffilesl/nij/grants/199372.pdf.
40.
charge.
41.

42.

In some cases, juries can compromise if they have the option of convicting on a less serious
See supra notes 9-21 and accompanying text.

Taylor v. Louisiana, 429 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1975).

43.
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 124-32 (1984); ITZHAK GILBOA,
RATIONAL CHOICE 100-01 (2010); Ming Zeng & Xiao-Ping Chen, Achieving Cooperationin Multiparty
Alliances: A Social Dilemma Approach to PartnershipManagement, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 587 passim

(2003).
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choose cooperation with each other than when they have a one-shot
relationship. Cooperation is also more likely in relationships with an
indefinite time horizon, as with Justices who have lifetime appointments,
than when there is a finite time horizon. Finally, cooperation is more
common among individuals who come to their relationship with equal status
and authority. That is true about Supreme Court Justices, except perhaps with
Chief Justices. The extra authority of a Chief Justice may not be that
important, but if it is, we could make the Chief's role a rotating position, as
is the case with some state supreme courts. 44
CONCLUSION
There is much dissatisfaction among Supreme Court observers with the
Court and its appointment process. And as the Court's decisions and
appointment process have become increasingly divisive, public approval of
the Supreme Court has declined. A majority of Americans once expressed
strong confidence in the court. According to a July 2018 Gallup poll, only
37% do now.45 Reforming the Supreme Court would do much to restore
public faith in the Court. And it also would bring the Court into conformity
with the requirements of due process.
44.

See, e.g., Supreme Court Judges, Mo. CTS. https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=133 (last

visited Nov. 8, 2018) ("[T]he chief justice typically is elected on a rotating basis by a vote of all seven
Supreme Court judges to a two-year term."). Or consider a model from Switzerland. The members of the
Swiss Federal Council rotate through the position of president so they remain true equals in the Swiss
executive branch.
45.
Megan Brenan, Confidence in Supreme Court Modest, but Steady, GALLUP (July 2, 2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/236408/confidence-supreme-court-modest-steady.aspx.
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